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Abstract
This paper proposes a tractable model of a dynamic contest where players have
private information about the contest’s prize. We show that private information
helps to encourage players who have fallen behind, leading to an increase in aggre-
gate incentives. We derive the optimal information design for a designer interested
in the maximization of aggregate effort. Optimal signals turn out to be private
and imperfectly informative and aim to level the playing field at any stage of the
dynamic interaction.
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“But many that are first shall be last; and the last shall be first.” (Matthew
19:30 King James Bible.)
1 Introduction
Contests are a well-understood and frequently employed method of providing incentives.
There are concerns, however, that in dynamic settings, incentives may become under-
mined by the so-called discouragement effect.1 As for losers of earlier stages, winning
the overall contest requires efforts beyond the ones necessary for catching up, they are
discouraged from fighting on. This in turn allows winners of earlier stages to reduces
their efforts, leading to a deterioration of incentives on aggregate. As a consequence of
the discouragement effect, innovation may be obstructed from successful completion by
an early break through and workers may become demotivated to strive for promotion by
an early success of their colleagues.
In this article, we analyze the effect of private information on players’ incentives to ex-
ert effort in a dynamic contest. Although in many economic settings, private information
has a negative impact, in dynamic contests private information turns out to be beneficial.
Our starting point is the observation that when players are privately informed about the
(common) value of the prize and cannot observe each others efforts, then an early loss
has to be taken as good news about the value of the prize. This is because a loss is more
likely to happen when the opponent exerted a high level of effort which requires that the
opponent attaches a high value to the contest’s prize. For example, an early innovation
break through may be the consequence of a large R&D effort by a rival company whose
private market-research has revealed a prosperous market for the prospective product.
Similarly, a rival’s success in the early stages of a promotion contest can be understood as
the result of his hard work, which was motivated by his positive view about the company’s
1See Konrad and Kovenock (2009); Ryvkin (2011);Dubey (2013); Fu et al. (2018); Aiche et al. (2019);
Fang et al. (2020); Sela and Tsahi (2020);Zhang and Zhou (2016).
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career prospects.
In our model two homogeneous players compete in a best-of-three contest by exerting
costly efforts in three sequential battles. The winner of the overall contest obtains a prize
whose value is uncertain (one or zero) but the same for each player.2 Each player observes
a private imperfect signal (good or bad) that is informative about the prize. Motivated by
the above examples, an important assumption of our model is that players are unable to
observes their rival’s efforts. All they observe is the identity of the winner of each battle.
For most models of dynamic contests, the introduction of imperfect information makes
the analysis intractable. Our model lends its tractability from the simplifying assumption
that one of the signal-realizations is conclusive about the value of the prize. In particular,
assuming that a bad signal can only be received when the prize is zero enables us to
focus our analysis on the efforts players exert after receiving a good signal. An important
variable of our model is the signal’s informativeness, given by the likelihood with which
a bad signal is generated when the prize is zero.
As a benchmark, we consider the case, where signals are observed publicly rather than
privately. Our main result shows that (expected) aggregate effort, that is individual efforts
added across players and battles, is strictly higher under private information than under
public information, except for the limiting case where signals are perfectly informative
or completely uninformative. Interestingly, while under public information, aggregate
effort is independent of the signals’ informativeness, under private information, aggregate
effort is maximized when signals are of intermediate informativeness. Hence, although our
analysis is restricted to a subset of all possible information-structures by our assumption
that one signal is conclusive, our model offers insights about the optimal information
design in dynamic contest settings.
2An alternative but analogue formulation of our model assumes that the contest’s prize is certain but
that players face uncertainty about the (common) value of their marginal costs of effort. For example,
R&D expenditures may depend on a common input (e.g. labor) whose price is uncertain.
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2 Model
We consider two homogeneous players engaged in a dynamic best-of-three contest for a
single prize. The contest consists of three identical, consecutive battles and the prize
is awarded to the first player achieving a total number of two wins. In each battle
t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, each player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses an effort eit ≥ 0 at cost C(eit) = eit and
wins the battle with probability eit
e1t+e2t
when e1t + e2t 6= 0 and with probability 12 when
e1t + e2t = 0. An important assumption of our model is that players observe the outcome
of each battle, but not the effort exerted by their opponent.
There is uncertainty about the size of the prize, which can take two values normalized
to V = 0 and V = 1. Both values are assumed to be equally likely. Before the start of
the first battle, each player obtains a private informative signal si ∈ {B,G} about the
value of v. Signals are independent draws from the same conditional probability distri-
bution Pr(si|v) specified by the following matrix: The parameter σ ∈ (0, 1) measures the
Pr(si|v) V = 0 V = 1
si = B σ 0
si = G 1− σ 1
informativeness of the players’ signals. In particular, for σ → 1 players become perfectly
informed about the value of the prize, whereas for σ → 0 signals become completely un-
informative. Note that implicit in this formulation is the assumption that a “bad” signal
si = B is conclusive, as it can only be received when the prize is zero. This assumption
greatly simplifies the analysis because it implies that efforts must be zero after the ob-
servation of a bad signal. Hence, our analysis can concentrate on the players’ behavior
conditional on receiving a “good” signal. In our setting, a symmetric equilibrium can
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3 denote efforts during the first and the third battle, respectively,
whereas e∗L and e
∗
F denote a player’s effort in the intermediate battle depending on whether
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the player has won (leader) or lost (follower) before.3
3 Equlibrium








Suppose that both players have accumulated one win and consider a player’s effort choice
in battle 3. If the player has obtained a bad signal he knows that there is nothing to be
won and will therefore exert zero effort. In contrast, if the player has obtained a good
signal, then he must conclude that his opponent has also observed a good signal, since
otherwise the opponent would not have exerted effort and could not have won any of the
contests before. Hence, conditional on having observed a good signal a player’s expected
value of the prize is given by
VG ≡ E[V |s1 = s2 = G] =
1
1 + (1− σ)2 (1)





VG − e3. (2)
The unique solution to this problem follows from evaluating the corresponding first-order
condition at e3 = e
∗















represents the players’ continuation value from drawing (one win each) after completion
of the first two battles.
3A player’s effort in the third battle is independent of the sequencing of past-outcomes (win-loss,
loss-win) because in equilibrium the third battle can be reached only when both players have observed a
good signal (and hence exert positive efforts), giving players identical beliefs about the value of the prize.
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3.2 Battle 2
Consider now the second battle and denote by L (leader) and F (follower) the winner
and the loser of the first battle. Conditional on having observed a good signal, player
i ∈ {L, F} must form beliefs about the likelihood with which his opponent j has also
observed a good signal. These beliefs are crucial determinants of a player’s effort because
only when the opponent has observed a good signal there actually exists a prize worth
fighting for (V > 0) and effort is necessary for winning the second battle (ej > 0).
Assuming that the follower exerted effort in the first battle, he must conclude from
losing that battle that his opponent has observed a good signal with certainty. Had his
opponent observed a bad signal he would have exerted zero effort and would not have
defeated him. In particular, we have
Pr(sj = G|i = F, si = G) = 1. (5)
In contrast to the follower, the leader does not know whether he won the first battle be-
cause he was more lucky or because his opponent failed to provide effort after observation
of a bad signal. Moreover, the distinction between these two cases depends on the effort
the leader has taken in battle 1. In particular, if the leader chose effort e1 > 0 and the
follower adheres to the equilibrium, then the leader would have won the first contest with
probability e1
e1+e∗1
in case sj = G and with probability 1 in case sj = B. Bayesian updating
thus implies that from the viewpoint of the leader, the likelihood with which the follower
has observed a good signal is given by
Pr(sj = G|i = L, si = G) =
1 + (1− σ)2






It is important to note that
Pr(sj = G|i = F, si = G) > Pr(sj = G|i = L, si = G), (7)
which means that the follower has a stronger belief than the leader that the prize is worth
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fighting for. It is in this sense, that losing the first battle “encourages” effort in the second
battle.4
In equilibrium, effort choices (e∗L, e
∗

















U3 − eF , (9)
where we have abbreviated notation by letting
P ∗2 ≡ P2(e∗1) =
1 + (1− σ)2
1 + (1− σ)2 + 2σ(1− σ) . (10)
The corresponding first-order conditions





























(3P ∗2 + 1)
2
. (14)
The probability with which the players draw after the second battle, making the third







1 + 3P ∗2
. (15)




2 ∈ (0, 1). (16)
4The fact that a deviation from e∗
1
to e1 6= e∗1 influences the informativeness of the first battle’s
outcome will have an effect for the determination of the equilibrium effort level e∗1 in Section 3.3.
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Off-equilibrium, that is, after deviating to e1 6= e∗1 during the first battle, the leader will
update his belief to P2(e1) rather than P
∗
2 and hence choose the effort eL that solves (11)
with P ∗2 substituted by P2(e1). Off-equilibrium, the leader will therefore choose
eL(e1) =
√
P2(e1)(VG − U3)e∗F − e∗F (17)
with e∗F given by (13).
For our analysis of battle 1 contained in the subsequent section it is useful to define
the continuation values of entering battle 2 as the leader or the follower, conditional on
the opponent having observed a good or a bad signal. These continuation values are given
by
UGL (e1) ≡ U3 +
eL(e1)
eL(e1) + e∗F
(VG − U3)− eL(e1) (18)






U3 − e∗F (20)
UBF ≡ −e∗F . (21)
3.3 Battle 1
Finally, consider the players’ behavior in battle 1. A player who observes a bad signal will
not exert any effort. A player who observes a good signal will believe that his opponent
also observed a good signal with probability
P1 =
1 + (1− σ)2
2− σ . (22)













UGF ] + (1− P1)UBL (e1)− e1. (23)
Note that here we have made use of the fact that, conditional on the opponent having
observed a bad signal, a player with a good signal cannot become the follower in battle
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2 if he exerts effort (no matter how small) in battle 1. The equilibrium value e∗1 can be














UGL (e1) + (1− P1)UBL (e1)
]










VG + (1− eL(e1)eL(e1)+e∗F )U3]− eL(e1)
1
2
P1 + 1− P1
(25)
and that the numerator in (25) is identical to the leader’s objective function in battle 2







UGL (e1) + (1− P1)UBL (e1)
]
|e1=e∗1 = 0. (26)













VG − (e∗L − e∗F )
4e∗1
= 1. (27)




. This raises the player’s chance of securing an early victory and reduces the risk of an
early victory by the opponent, leading an overall benefit of VG − U3 + U3 = VG. As both
of these events require that the respective leader wins the second battle, VG is multiplied







. By making a player more likely to become
the leader rather than the follower, an increase in e1 also induces additional effort costs









4(3P ∗2 + 1)
2
> 0, (28)
the overall effect is positive and must be balanced by the marginal cost of first stage effort












Aggregating efforts across battles and players, we obtain the following expression for
expected aggregate effort:











· 2e∗3) + Pr(s1 6= s2)(e∗1 + e∗L). (30)
With probability
Pr(s1 = s2 = G) =
1
2
[1 + (1− σ)2] (31)
both players obtain a good signal and therefore exert the corresponding efforts in battles
1 and 2. Efforts in battle 3 are exerted only if it is reached which happens when the







Pr(s1 6= s2) =
1
2
· 2σ(1− σ) (32)
one player receives a good signal while the other player receives a bad signal. In this case
only the player with the good signal exerts efforts and wins the contest already after two
battles.
In the Appendix we proof the following result:
Proposition 1. Expected aggregate effort E∗(σ) is maximized when information levels
the playing field in the intermediate battle, that is for σ = σdraw ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 is depicted in Figure 1. Aggregate effort is inverse U -shaped, with a
maximum at the place where the likelihood that the second battle is one by the follower
rather than by the leader is highest. Aggregate incentives are maximized when the players’
information makes their incentives to compete in the second battle as similar as possible.
For this purpose, the encouraging news contained in a first battle loss is sought to counter
the discouraging effect of a lag in the number of accumulated wins, thereby balancing the
follower’s and the leader’s incentives to fight.
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4 Benchmark: Public signals
In order to understand the effect that private information has on the players’ incentives
to exert effort, this section considers as a benchmark the case where information is public.
In particular, the following analysis assumes that signals (s1, s2) are observed publicly, by
both players, rather than privately.
As a bad signal is conclusive, under public information a player will exert effort only
after observing (s1, s2) = (G,G). The players’ expectations of the contest’s prize is then
given by VG and the analysis of battle 3 is the same as under private information (where
players conclude that their opponent must have observed a good signal since otherwise







In battle 2, players no longer differ in their beliefs about their opponent’s signal. The
equilibrium efforts under public information can therefore be obtained by setting P2 = 1









Under public information the leader wins also the second battle with probability 3
4
. Hence,






























(UL − UF )− e1 (38)
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Expected aggregate effort under public information is then given by













Proposition 2. Expected aggregate effort is higher when signals are observed privately
rather than publicly. This result holds independently of the signals’ quality, i.e. E∗(σ) >
EPUB for all σ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 1 depicts aggregate effort in dependence of the informativeness σ of the players’
signals. While aggregate effort is independent of σ when signals are public, under private
information aggregate effort is inverse U-shaped. Proposition 2 emphasizes the important
Figure 1: Aggregate Effort: Comparison of aggregate effort under private (black) and
public information (red), in dependence of the quality σ of the players’ signals. σ = 1 and
σ = 0 correspond to the cases where signals are perfectly informative or not informative
at all.
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role of private information in dynamic battles. In particular, it shows that withholding
information about a contest’s prize can be useful only when players may form differing
beliefs about the prospects of winning.
5 Static contest
In order to understand the origin of Proposition 1 it is useful to consider the static
analogue of our dynamic contest setting. For this purpose, suppose that the contest
consists of only one battle and the prize V is awarded to the winner of that battle. Under






VG − eS (41)








2− σ . (42)
Given that each player receives a good signal with probability




expected aggregate effort is






Under public information both signals are observed by both players and players will exert





VG − eS (45)






Expected aggregate effort under public information is






Note that in the static contest, expected aggregate effort under private information is the
same as expected aggregate effort under public information. Whether signals are private
or public has no influence on aggregate incentives in a static setting. Hence it must be
the dynamic nature of our best-of-three contest which explains the increase in aggregate
incentives due to private information. One might have thought that private information
raises aggregate effort because it allows a player to exert effort even when his opponent has
observed a bad signal. However, this reasoning applies equally well in the static and the
dynamic setting, and as aggregate effort in the static setting remains unaffected, cannot
be the reason behind the increase in aggregate effort in the dynamic setting.
In order to understand why private information may increase aggregate incentives in
dynamic contests, we will now have a closer look at the individual efforts in each of the
three battles.
6 The encouragement effect
So why does private information increase aggregate incentives? In order to shed light on
this question, let us consider each battle in separation. As efforts in battle 3 are identical
under private and public information, we can concentrate our analysis on battles 1 and 2.
Consider battle 2 first. Winning battle 2 is less beneficial for the follower than for
the leader, as the follower is required to exert additional effort to win the overall contest
in battle 3. This fact has become known as the discouragement effect. As we have
seen in Section 3.2 private information makes winning the first battle bad news about the
contest’s prize, thereby dampening the leader’s incentive to exert effort. As a consequence,
the follower becomes encouraged to exert higher effort, bringing efforts levels in battle 2
closer to each other. In particular, we have the following result:
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Proposition 3 (Encouragement). When signals are observed privately rather than pub-
licly, the effort-differential between the leader and the follower is reduced, i.e. 0 <
e∗L−e∗F < ePUBL −ePUBF . As a consequence, the final battle is reached with higher probability
when signals are private.
Proof: See Appendix.
Private information “levels the playing field” in that it endows the disadvantaged
player with a stronger belief in the value of fighting. The downside of this encouragement
effect is that players’ will attach less value to becoming the leader. In particular, we also
have the following result:
Proposition 4. When signals are observed privately rather than publicly, players invest




Figure 2: Battle Efforts: Comparison of efforts e1 (dotted) eL (dashed), and eF (dash-
dotted) under private (black) and public information (red), in dependence of the quality
σ of the players’ signals. σ = 1 and σ = 0 correspond to the cases where signals are
perfectly informative or not informative at all.
15
Figure 2 depicts efforts in battles 1 and 2 in dependence of the informativeness σ of
players signals. Private information raises the follower’s effort while reducing the leader’s
effort in battle 2. This raises the likelihood of a draw after battle 2 which reduces efforts
in battle 1.
7 The last shall be first?
In our model, the follower is discouraged by the fact that he has fallen behind but becomes
encouraged by the “good news” contained in his first-battle loss. The overall effect is that
his effort falls short of the leader’s effort, i.e. e∗F < e
∗
L. We now extend our model, in
order to show, that, more generally, the encouragement effect may be strong enough to
overcome the discouragement effect. In particular, we will show that, in the spirit of
Matthews’s quote, the loser of the first stage is more likely to be the winner of the second
stage, i.e. e∗F > e
∗
L, if the contest’s outcome is sufficiently noisy.






Following Tullock, the parameter r ∈ (0, 2) measures how sensitive a player’s probability
of winning is with respect to his own effort. Decreasing r makes the battle’s outcome less
sensitive with respect to efforts, or, equivalently, more random.














With the continuation value U3(r) =
2−r
4
VG of reaching the last battle, in the second
























U3(r)− eF . (49)
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(2 + r)P ∗2
.
As this expression is decreasing in r and converges to 1/P ∗2 > 1 for r → 0, we can state
the following result:
Proposition 5. The encouragement effect overcomes the discouragement effect when bat-
tle outcomes are sufficiently noisy, i.e. e∗F (r) > e
∗
L(r) for all r ∈ (0, r̄), with 0 < r̄ < 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that, since P2(σ) is U-shaped, r̄(σ) is inverse U-shaped with limσ→0 r̄(σ) =
limσ→1 r̄(σ) = 0, i.e. more noise is required to make the last become first, when signals
are very informative or very uninformative, i.e. when the privacy of information becomes
irrelevant.
8 Conclusion
This paper has identified an encouragement effect in dynamic contests where players have
private information about the contest’s prize. Losers of early stages become encouraged by
the fact that losing conveys good news about their opponent’s effort and hence the value
of the contest’s prize. We have shown that due to the encouragement effect, aggregate
incentives are maximized when information about the contest’s prize is private rather than
public and imperfect rather than perfect. Our model thereby provides insights about the
optimal information design in dynamic contests.
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Appendix: Proofs




, and P ∗2 VG =
1
2−σ2
, then, after some algebraic manipulations
E∗(σ) =
1
16(3P ∗2 + 1)
2








E∗(σ) ≥ EPUB = 41
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(1− P1), the previous inequality holds iff
3P ∗2 (9P
∗




2 + 1) + 4(3P
∗







(3P ∗2 + 1)
2







2 + 6P ∗2 + 1]
⇔ P ∗2 [18 + 288
P ∗2
P1
− 297P ∗2 ] ≥ 9.






, the left-hand side is inverse U-shape with a
maximum at σ = 2 −
√
2 and a minimum at σ = {0, 1}, in which case the left-hand side
is equal to 9.
Proof Proposition 3:
Using the equations (13), (14), (34), and (35),





3P ∗2 − 1




⇔ 15P ∗2 2 − 14P ∗2 ≤ 1,
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which holds for any P ∗2 ∈ [0, 1].
Proof Proposition 4:




















⇔ 91 + (1− σ)
2







1 + (1− σ)2 )
2.
The left-hand side is U-shaped with maximums at σ = {0, 1} when it gets a value of 14.






is decreasing and continuous in r, with 1/3P ∗2 < 1 when r → 1
and 1/P ∗2 > 1 when r → 0.
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